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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review this appeal from
the judgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County,
State of Utah, dated April 4, 2006, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-2-(2) (j) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issues for Review and Standard of Review:
a.

Did the lower court err in ruling that the decision

of the Provo City Board of Adjustment was not arbitrary, capricious,
or illegal?

In determining whether the decision of the Board of

Adjustment was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal, the appellate
court gives no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law,
which are reviewed for correctness.
State,

Blue

Cross

& Blue

Shield

v.

119 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989).
b.

Did the lower court err in dismissing "all claims

and theories" asserted in the consolidated action with prejudice?
In determining whether dismissal of all claims and theories was
proper, the appellate court should construe all facts in favor of
appellants.
c.

Hale v. Beckstead,

2005 UT 24, 116 P.3d 263.

Did the lower court err in granting Intervenors'

Motion to Intervene, thereby overriding the settlement agreement
agreed to between the Coxes and Provo City?

In reviewing the

court's grant of the Motion to Intervene, the appellate court gives
no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law, which are

reviewed for correctness.

Low v. City

of Monticello,

2004 UT 90,

103 P.3d 130.
Issues preserved below.

These issues were preserved in the

following:
•

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Leave to
Intervene; (R. 0381)

•

Plaintiffs'

Supplemental

Memorandum

Regarding Provo City

General Plan; (R. 0408)
•

Combined Memorandum in Support of M&S Cox Investments, LC's
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Provo City's
Motion for Summary Judgment; (R. 1105)

•

Petitioners' Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for
Summary Judgment; (R. 1122)

•

Plaintiffs'

Objection

to

Provo

City's Proposed Summary

Judgment and Order of Dismissal; (R. 1153)
•

Plaintiffs' Reply

to Defendant

Provo City's Response to

Plaintiffs' Objection to Its Proposed Summary Judgment and
Order of Dismissal; (R. 1194) and
•

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Leave to
Intervene. (R.

03 8)

DETERMINATIVE OR IMPORTANT
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The controlling rule is Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal comes before this Court from a final judgment of
the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah,
dated April 4, 2006 in consolidated cases Civil No. 000403654 and
Civil No. 040402050. (R. 1209)
The case is a dispute over (1) whether the lower court erred
in granting Interveners' Motion to Intervene, (2) whether the lower
court erred in dismissing "all claims and theories" in the consolidated action with prejudice, and (3) whether the lower court erred
in ruling

that

the determination by the Provo

City

Community

Development Director ("CDD") and approved by the Board of Adjustment

("BOA") that under the provisions of Provo City Ordinance

2000-15, § 14.30 (See Attachment #1), (R. 0433) the amortization
period applicable to M&S property was not arbitrary, capricious,
and illegal. The decision of the CDD was appealed to the Provo City
BOA and affirmed. (R. 1052)
On February 16, 2 001, Provo City filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment. (R. 0 040)

On November 22, 2 005, a Motion for Summary

Judgment was filed by M&S. (R. 0445)

The District Court, the

Honorable Steven L. Hansen presiding, granted Provo City's Motion
for Summary Judgment by Memorandum Decision dated April 4, 2006, and
denied the Motion for Summary Judgment of M&S. (R. 12 02)
A final judgment was entered on April 4, 2 006 (See Attachment
#2) . (R. 1204)

M&S filed its Notice of Appeal of that summary

judgment on April 13, 2006. (R. 1211)
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.

M&S ACQUIRES THE PROVO RESIDENCE.
1.

Petitioner M&S Cox Investments, LLC (nM&S") is the owner

of a residential property located at 1310 North 900 East in Provo.
(R. 1022)
2.

M&S

acquired

the

property

in

1996

for

a

sum

of

$192,624.00. (R. 1021)
3.

At the time M&S purchased the home, the property was zoned

Rl-Single Family Residential, with an U S " Supplementary Residential
Overlay.

The S-Overlay

provisions allowed M&S to maintain an

accessory dwelling unit, in addition to the normal dwelling unit in
the home.

There was no requirement that the owner occupy the home.

See Attachment #1, Provo City Code § 14.30.010 et seq. (R. 0433)
4.

M&S invested large quantities of time and over a half

million dollars remodeling the home in order to take advantage of
Provo City's S-overlay provision. (R. 0012, 1043)
5.

In addition to the purchase price, the total amount spent

on remodeling and updating the property, adjusted for inflation to
April 4, 2000, was $525,829.10.
6.

See

id.

M&S acquired the property in order to provide housing for

the Coxes in Provo, as well as to allow relatives of the Coxes to
live there while attending BYU and other educational institutions
in Utah County.

See id.,

p. 1.

It was anticipated that little or

no rent would be charged to these relatives while they lived in the
house. Neither M&S nor its owners ever intended for the acquisition

-4-

to be a profit-generating asset.

It was intended to be an invest-

ment for the Cox family's advanced education.
7.

See id.

This intention was carried out in reality.

From 1996 to

2 000, the house was occupied primarily by the Coxes' relatives and
friends, most of whom paid little or no rent to M&S.

See Applica-

tion for Amortization, p. 3, and records attached thereto. In those
years, M&S realized a net loss from its ownership of the property.

See

id.
8.

M&S's extensive remodel of the residence created two

separate dwelling units in the home, maximizing M&S's ability to
host grandchildren, nieces and nephews, and other relatives in Utah
County.
II.

See Statement of Grounds for Appeal. (R. 1052)

PROVO CITY ADOPTS ITS OWNER-OCCUPANT ORDINANCE WITH AMORTIZATION PROVISIONS.
9.

On April 4, 2 000, Provo City changed the S-Overlay

provisions of its City Code by adopting Ordinance 2 000-15

("the

Owner-Occupant Ordinance"). (R. 1031 See Attachment No. 1)
10.

The Owner-Occupant Ordinance implemented a new require-

ment that owners of homes with two dwelling units must occupy one
of those units. See id. , § 14.30 . 030 (2) (c) . Thus, in order to take
advantage of the "S-Overlay" provisions, an owner must live in the
home in person, rather than renting both units to tenants. Mervyn
and Sue Cox, owners of M&S, are residents of St. George, Utah.
11.

In April of 2000, shortly after Ordinance 2000-15 was

adopted, M&S sued Provo City in Federal Court, seeking to invalidate
the ordinance.

When that case was dismissed for failure to exhaust
-5-

available state law remedies, M&S filed its Complaint in the lower
Court on November 9, 2000. (R. 0014)

Among other things, M&S claims

that Provo's ordinance defining * family" and the ordinance limiting
ownership and occupancy of the 1310 home amount to unconstitutional
regulatory takings of M&S's property, that the City acted beyond its
authority in adopting the ordinances, and that the ordinances do not
promote a legitimate purpose, with respect to the properties on 900
East.

Id.
12.

At the time when this case had been pending for almost two

years, the parties had invested substantial time and resources in
reaching a resolution.

M&S and Provo City agreed to the terms of a

settlement, which both parties acknowledge and agree gave M&S nothing
more than that to which it is legally entitled under Provo's current
ordinances.
memorialize

(R. 1212 at pp. 39-40)
their

settlement

agreement

Before the parties

could

in writing, however,

the

Intervenors filed their motion to intervene. (R. 0341)
III. THE OWNER-OCCUPANT ORDINANCE'S "RECOVERY OF INVESTMENT" FORMULA.
13 .

The Owner-Occupant Ordinance allowed a non-resident owner

of affected property to apply to the Provo City Community Development Director ("CDD") for an extension of time in which to bring its
property into compliance with the owner-occupant requirement.

See

Ordinance 2000-15, § 14.30.090.
14.

This

xx

recovery of investment" or "amortization" provision

uses a mathematical formula to calculate the amount of time it will
take the owner to recover its investment in the home. The Ordinance
reads, in relevant part:
-6-

Termination of Nonconforming Uses - Recovery of Investment.
(1) The Community Development Director or his designee
shall grant an owner of property affected by Subsection
14.30.080(2) of this chapter an extension of the time
required to conform with such section if:
(a)

the owner:

(i) by August 4, 2000 files a notice of intent
to apply for a time extension as provided in this section;
and
(ii) by April 4, 2001 files a complete application for an extension of time as provided in this section.
(b) the owner's application for an extension of time
demonstrates by a preponderance of evidence that:
(i) The nonconforming use which is the subject
of the application was legally established; and
(ii) subject to the formula in Subsection (2) of
this section, the owner is unable to recover prior to April
4, 2003 the amount of the owner's investment in the property.
(2)
(a) The time period during which an owner may recover
the amount of his investment in property affected by Section
14.30.080(2) of this Chapter shall be determined by dividing
the residual value of the property by the average monthly
net rental income from the property. The resulting figure
is the number of months which the owner shall have to
recover his investment in the property.
(b) For the purposes of this subsection the following
definitions shall apply:
(i) u Amount of the owner's investment" means the
adjusted present value of the property as of April 4, 2000.
(ii) *Adjusted present value" means a property's
original purchase price plus any capital improvements and
less depreciation and net income from the property, all as
adjusted for inflation to April 4, 2000.
(iii) "Compliance value" means the appraised value
of the property on April 4, 2000 based on compliance with
the requirements of this Chapter.
(iv) vx Residual value" means
the difference
between a property's adjusted present value and its compliance value as of April 4, 2000.
(c) The time period determined under subsection (a)
of this section shall apply to the property for which the
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owner made an application for extension and to the owner's
successors, if any, until such time period has run.
(3) Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Community
Development Director or his designee applying this section
may appeal such decision to the Board of Adjustment as
provided in Chapter 14.05 of this title.
(4) The Community Development Director may adopt reasonable regulations to carry out the purpose of this section.
Provo City Ordinance 2000-15, § 14.30.090.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF THE OWNER-OCCUPANT ORDINANCE TO M&S'S PROPERTY.
15.

Two days after the Ordinance was passed, counsel for M&S

inquired of the City for information on applying for the extension.
(R. 0981)

M&S also asked for information on any regulations that

had been adopted regarding the administration of the amortization
formula. See id.

These letters were followed with other correspon-

dence inquiring on the proper method of applying for amortization.
(R. 0974, 0966)
16.

Counsel for Provo City responded to these inquiries by

stating that the City viewed M&S's circumstances as a possible "test
case" for the amortization formula. (R. 0968)

Despite multiple

inquiries by M&S, the City's correspondence never indicated that
any regulation had ever been adopted by the CDD regarding the
implementation of the amortization formula. (R. 0964, 0962, 0959)
The Board of Adjustment later acknowledged that no such regulations
have ever been promulgated. (R. 0610 at p. 96)
17.

Consistent with the provisions of the Ordinance and M&S's

frequent correspondence with counsel for Provo City, M&S made a
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timely application for amortization to the CDD on March 26, 2002.
(R. 0537)
18.

M&S's application methodically followed and explained the

City's statutory amortization formula, as applied to its property.
See id.

The application showed that, because of its high investment

in the property and its negative net income from the property, the
result under the City's formula is that M&S will have an infinite
number of months to recoup its investment.

See id.

Thus, by

operation of the City's formula, M&S is entitled to an unlimited
extension of time before it is required to comply with the OwnerOccupant Ordinance (because simple math dictates that any property
for which net income was a negative number would be entitled to an
unlimited period of time) . See id.
19.

Subsequent to the tender of the application for an

extension, Provo City and M&S entered negotiations to settle the
issue, in which Provo City indicated that M&S would receive a
permanent exemption from the owner-occupant requirement. (R. 0922)
20.

Not long after this offer was made, a group of Provo City

residents filed a Petition for Intervention in the case. (R. 0341)
21.

After the citizens began organizing to oppose M&S's

permanent exemption, counsel for M&S was informed that the CDD was
now unwilling to grant M&S's application due to political pressures
then being brought to bear on city officials. (R. 0924, 0902)

In

the context of these political pressures, the CDD withdrew its offer
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of an open-ended exemption, and suggested that M&S agree to a 20year amortization.
22.

M&S declined.

See id.

At the hearing on the Motion to Intervene on January 25,

2003, the following discussion took place between David C. Dixon,
Provo City Attorney, and the Court:
STATEMENT BY MR. DIXON
MR. DIXON: The only thing that occurred to
me, your Honor, is just the settlement as I
understand it, a, does not involve zoning enforcement as Mr. Call mentioned at the end there.
In other words, if they have improper occupancy
in the future we're not precluded from prosecuting them for violations of the zoning ordinance.
So we're not compromising any rights in terms of
the future. We're just resolving a lawsuit that
deals with the a, amortization provisions and
what kinds of occupancy they would be allowed
under our ordinances.
THE JUDGE: So basically you agree with
Mr. Call's argument?
MR. DIXON: Yes. I don't think he misstated
anything in terms of our position.
THE JUDGE: So you want to go forward and
settle the case?
MR. DIXON: Yes.
THE JUDGE: Which means to me that you're
opposing this motion to intervene because they
don't want you to settle the case, they want to
get involved and contest this entire settlement.
Although you haven't said that isn't that, isn't
that the inference I'm to draw from that that the
city is opposing is opposing this motion to
intervene, they want to go ahead and force the
settlement agreement that they feel is a proper
and lawful exercise of their powers and rights
under the law?
MR. DIXON: I think we have the right to
settle it and we think we've got a reasonable
settlement. (R. 1212 at pp. 39-40)
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23.

In April

2003,

Provo

City Attorney

Gary

Gregerson

admitted to delaying final determination of M&S's request of an
indefinite extension due to a movement by some residents of the
Wasatch Neighborhood to intervene in the court case then pending
against the City (now consolidated with the more recently filed
case). (R. 0908)
24.

Meanwhile, the City asked M&S for further documentation

of the figures used in its calculation of the amortization formula.
(R. 0908)
25.

M&S undertook to document all of its figures and answer

every question raised by the City. (R. 0898) At great expense, M&S
collected and delivered to the City a set of documents reflecting
all expenses and income related to the property between 1995 and
2000.

See
26.

id.
In October 2003, the City unofficially communicated to

M&S that the application for an unlimited exemption would be denied.
(R. 0644, 0641, 0638)
27.

Finally, on March 9, 2004, almost one year after M&S's

formal application, the CDD wrote to M&S informing it that it had
been granted an extension of only 22 years and 3 months in which to
recover its investment. (R. 0631)

This period almost exactly

matches the period suggested earlier by the CDD when they came under
political pressure not to allow M&S the extension afforded by the
City's formula. (R. 0924)
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28.

The CDD's denial letter did not explain how the City

arrived at completely different numbers from those submitted by M&S
for

total

capital

expenses, net

income, and residual value.

(R. 0631)
V. PROVO CITY'S ARBITRARY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMORTIZATION FORMULA.
29.

In implementing its calculation, the City plugged in

numbers completely different from those submitted by M&S, without
any explanation for the discrepancies.

For example, where M&S

submitted

improvements

documents

showing

capital

totaling

$525,829.10, the City's formula shows a figure of $481,490.84,
subtracting nearly $45,000 from M&S's figure.
30.

Further, the City applied

(R 0631)

two different numbers

in

different places of the formula, for the same concept of "net income
from the property."

The City's formula requires the input of a

figure for net income from the property in determining the value of
both "adjusted present value" and "monthly net rental income from
the property."

See Provo City Code § 14.30.090(2) & (2)(b)(ii).

In the first part of the formula, the CDD used a figure of
($27,004.60) as "net income." (R. 0630)

Then, after stating that

net income is ($27,004.60), the CDD came up with a completely
different figure for net income in the section of its calculation
that calculates average monthly rental income, namely, $31,742.06.
See id.,
31.

p. 2, section 6.
If the City had applied its own figure of ($27,004.60) for

net income in section 6 of its calculation formula, the outcome of
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the formula would have to be a negative number, giving M&S an
unlimited exemption.
32.

See

id.

The Ordinance does not provide for different definitions

of "net income from the property" in the two different parts of the
formula that apply the concept. See Provo City Ordinance 2000-15,
§§ 14.30.090(2) (a) & (2)(b)(ii). (R. 1031)
33.

The CDD used the positive figure for net income in the

part of the formula that calculated average net monthly rental
income, where a higher number will automatically decrease the
length of the exemption period. (R. 0557)
34.

The City's second, positive figure for "net income" is

quite different from the figure submitted by M&S, and from the
figure produced by the City's own calculations in its own worksheet
at section 5. M&S calculated its net income by simply adding up all
rental receipts for the period that it owned and operated the
property and subtracting its operating expenses. (R. 1022)

The

resulting negative number reflected that M&S spent more money than
it made on the property, giving it a negative net income.
35.

See

id.

In documents provided to M&S, the City attempted to

explain how it reached its positive "net income" figure. (R. 063 0
p. 3)

The City's accountant made the decision to only factor in

rental income between 1999 and 2 000, stating that no earlier period
was considered because "the property was still under renovation and
not completely available for rent."

See id.

The accountant

therefore decided that the earlier rents were irrelevant because
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"rental income from periods prior to 1999 would not be an accurate
reflection of expected future rental."
36.

Id.

The accountant's assertion that the property was not

*completely available for rent" until 1999 was not based on any
evidence or finding that has ever been divulged to M&S. It is also
directly contrary to the only evidence in the record. Specifically,
M&S's income statements show gross rental receipts of $4,600;
$3,882.53; and $24,635.70, respectively, for 1996, 1997, and 1998.
See Financial Schedules attached to March 26, 2002 Application for
Amortization, BOA Record Exhibit 12. These receipts show that M&S
was renting its property between 1996 and 1998, despite the city
accountant's assertions.
37.

See

id.

Even if it were correct that the property was not

"completely available for rent," the Ordinance makes no provision
for exclusion of years when a property is not being completely
rented.
38.

See Provo City Ordinance 2000-15, § 14.30.090.
The notion that "net income from the property" should

somehow track fictional projected future rental receipts is not
contained in the Ordinance. See id.

The Ordinance simply calls for

an accounting of "net rental income from

the

property."

Id.

(emphasis added).
39.

The City's second figure for "net income" relies on just

such a future projection of fictional income. In coming up with the
total of $31,742.06, the City combined the net rental receipts for
1999 with the receipts for the first six months of 2000, and then
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added projected

receipts for the final six months of 2000, for which

no data was available. (R. 630 p. 2, section 6) The Ordinance makes
no provision
amortization

for speculating on future rental
calculation.

income in the

See Provo City Ordinance 2000-15,

§ 14.30.090.
40.

In summary, in arriving at a positive number for average

monthly net rental income, the City selected the income figures for
the only 18-month period in which M&S had positive net rental
receipts and ignored those months for which M&S had a negative net
rental income. Id.,

p. 3. By using numbers from only 1999 and the

first six months of 2000 (and then adding the projected future
receipts of the last six months of 2000) , the City arrived at a
positive number for net income. Id.,

p. 2. If it had included all

the years of "net rental income from the property" as submitted by
M&S, both net income figures used by the City would have been
negative numbers, assuring an open-ended extension for M&S.

By

using a positive number as "net income" in only one part of the
amortization formula, the City "calculated" a finite number of
months for M&S's extension.
VI.

See id.

THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENTS APPROVAL OF THE CITY'S CALCULATION.
41.

M&S appealed the CDD's decision to the Provo City Board

of Adjustment.
42.

See Notice of Appeal. (R. 1046)

At an appeal hearing held on May 20, 2004, the Board of

Adjustment heard argument from both M&S and Provo City, and denied
relief to M&S. (R. 614)
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43.

During the hearing, some Board members expressed their

view that it seemed unfair for M&S to allow tenants to live in its
space without paying market value rents. (R. 610, pp. 19, 97)
44.

Board members also expressed a desire to require the

outcome of the formula to be "reasonable. " See id.,

pp. 95-97, 99.

At the same time, Board members also expressed confusion about what
the limits of a "reasonable" exemption period might be.

See

id.,

pp. 67, 96.
45.

In its stated findings of fact, the Board explicitly

based its denial of relief on the authority of the CDD to make
reasonable regulations in applying the City's formula.

See Board

of Adjustment Report of Action. (R. 614, p. 3, Finding No. 8)

The

central role this regulation-making power played in the Board's
decision was illustrated by many Board members' comments during the
hearing. (R. 610, pp. 67, 97-98) This occurred even while one Board
member acknowledged that the CDD had not actually promulgated any
regulations.
46.

See id.

p. 96.

M&S timely filed its Petition for Review with the Court

on May 5, 2004, stating claims for relief from the Board of
Adjustment's decision. (R. 1048)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Having pursued extended negotiations a settlement of all
issues in this case was arrived at between plaintiffs and Provo City
that both parties believed protected their respective interests.
Before the agreement could be memorialized the lower court, in
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error, permitted the intervenors to enter the case to object to and
second guess the City's decision to settle. The lower court erred
because the intervenors have no standing in this case.
After retracting from its agreed-upon settlement the City then
misapplied its owner occupant ordinance.

The City had previously

agreed that plaintiffs were entitled to an indefinite period to
recoup their investment in the property without having to comply
with the owner occupant ordinance.

Under political pressure from

the intervenors, however, the City's Community Development Director
("CDD") and the City Board of Adjustment ("BOA"), through improper
creative and selective manipulation of the certain provisions of
the ordinance, arrived at an amortization period of 22 years and 3
months rather than an indefinite period required by faithful
application of the ordinance.

The lower court erred when it

affirmed the decisions of the CDD and BOA because the CDD's and
BOA's

(and the lower court's) application of the ordinance to

plaintiffs was both legally wrong and arbitrary.
In entering a final judgment the lower court again erred in
dismissing plaintiffs' complaint "together with all claims and
theories asserted therein" because plaintiffs' "as applied" claims
had never been raised, briefed, argued to or decided by the court.
ARGUMENT
I.

IT WAS ERROR TO RULE THAT THE DECISION OF THE CITY BOARD OF
ADJUSTMENT WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR ILLEGAL,
Provo City failed to follow its ordinance in determining the

length of M&S's exemption. The City's action was therefore illegal.
-17-

See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3) (d) ("A determination of illegality
requires a determination that the decision . . . violates a[n] . . .
ordinance"). The City claimed that illegality requires a violation
of "prohibitory or mandatory provisions" of an ordinance, and that
such a violation is not present here.

See Provo City's Combined

Reply/Opp. Memo. p. 5. On the contrary, the ordinance in question
repeatedly employs mandatory language.

See Provo City Ordinance

2000-15, § 14.30.090(1)("The Community Development Director . . .
shall

grant an owner . . . extension of the time required to conform

with such section . . . ") ; id.

§ 14.30.090 (2) ("The time period

during which an owner may recover the amount of his investment in
property . . . shall

be determined by dividing the residual value

of the property by the average monthly net rental income from the
property.").

These provisions unambiguously required the City to

perform the calculations mandated by the ordinance.
violated

this mandate, preferring

instead

The City

to act on its own

conceptions of legislative intent and "reasonableness."

Its acts

were therefore illegal.
Provo City also implied, without support, that the "correctness" standard under an illegality challenge is used rarely--mostly
in instanc€^s where procedural rules have been violated.
City's Combined Reply/Opp. Memo. p. 3.

See Provo

In reality, Utah courts

often apply the illegality standard in reviewing many types of
zoning decisions.

See, e.g., Carrier

v. Salt

Lake County,

2004 UT

98, 104 P. 3d 1208 (applying illegality analysis to challenge of
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expansion of gravel pit where another ordinance suggested that use
was not approved) ; Save

Lake County,

Our Canyons

v. Bd.

of

Adjustment

Salt

2005 UT App 285, 528 P. 3d 978 (analyzing allegations

of improper variance under illegality standard); Patterson
Cty.

of

Bd. of Adjustment,

v.

Utah

893 P.2d 602 (UtahCt. App. 1995) (applying

illegality analysis to decision allowing airstrip to be built,
where airstrip layout might violate an ordinance).
The instant case is particularly well-suited to analysis under
the illegality prong of the statute, given that it involves the
interpretation of statutory language.

In explaining its low-

deference approach to illegality challenges, the Utah Supreme Court
stated in Carrier
statutes
Carrier,

remains

that "the interpretation of ordinances and
firmly within

the province

of

the courts."

2004 UT 98, 3[ 28. Further, it is this Court's province to

ensure that the City construed the ordinance liberally in favor of
the property owner.

See Patterson,

893 P. 2d at 606.

The City has specific language in its ordinance that enumerates, with mandatory
determined.
ordinance.

language, how certain rights are to be

In assessing M&S's rights, the City violated the
The lower Court should therefore have treated plain-

tiffs' appeal as an illegality challenge under the statute and
review the decision for correctness with only a level of "nonbinding deference."

See Carrier,

104 P. 3d 1216.x

1

M&S re-emphasizes that its position does not depend upon the Court's
selection of the correctness standard under the illegality prong of the statute.
Even if the Court were to opt for the higher level of deference applied under the
arbitrary and capricious standard, the City's decision was sufficiently
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A.

There Is No Evidence That the Drafters of the Ordinance
Intended to Completely Terminate All Nonconforming Uses.

Provo's new argument about the City Council's legislative
intent obscures the hard realities of the City's arbitrary calculations. The City cites a Utah enabling statute that grants authority
to cities to set amortization periods for the recovery of investments in nonconforming uses. The City suggests the state statute's
reference to utermination of nonconforming uses" somehow determines
the full scope and full intent of the Provo City Council in adopting
the particular ordinance in this case.

See Provo City Reply/Opp.

Memo., p. 6. The statute, however, is permissive--allowi.ng cities
to pass finite amortization periods, but does not mandate

that they

do so. Indeed, the statute has nothing at all to say about how the
amortization period is to be calculated, or whether an infinite
amortization period might be acceptable, reasonable, or even
required under some circumstances.
The state statute is the only source offered for Provo City's
oft-repeated, bedrock assertion that the ordinance manifests an
intention to bring all nonconforming uses to an end.

Based on the

evidence on the record, the drafters of the ordinance might have had
any number of other intentions--including the intention to protect
the investments of the owners of nonconforming properties.

The

City's argument is also defeated by the plain language of the
ordinance.

Under the City's logic, the same drafters who adopted

irrational and lacking in support that it should have been overturned.
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an ordinance meant to completely terminate a l l nonconforming uses
a l s o i n s e r t e d a formula t h a t allows some nonconforming uses to
continue i n d e f i n i t e l y .

The City would have the Court adopt i t s own

view of the i n t e n t i o n s of the d r a f t e r s , even where t h a t view would
v i o l a t e the p l a i n language and completely foreseeable outcome of
the ordinance.
B.

This r e s u l t i s unacceptable. 2

The City Cannot Protest M&S's Use of Depreciation since
the City Has Used Depreciation in I t s Own Calculations.

The City a l s o r a i s e d the new argument t h a t M&S's proposed openended

extension

incorrectly

"double-dips"

in

its

accounting,

decreasing i t s net income figure by s u b t r a c t i n g d e p r e c i a t i o n from
i t s t o t a l r e c e i p t s . 3 This argument has an insurmountable flaw.
City

presumably

did

not

include

depreciation

in

its

The

initial

c a l c u l a t i o n of net income, but s t i l l reached a negative net income
figure

of

outcome. 4

-$27,004.60--a number t h a t would assure an

See March 8, 2004 J a n i c e Larsen Memo., p . 2, s e c t i o n s 1

and 5, BOA Record Exhibit 26.
include d e p r e c i a t i o n
against

infinite

its

in t h i s

i n c l u s i o n now.)

(Alternatively,
calculation,
Thus,

it

if the City did
can hardly

even following

the

argue
City's

2
P a i r e d w i t h t h e s e a s s e r t i o n s of t h e d r a f t e r s ' unknown and unknowable
i n t e n t i o n s i s another c o u n t e r - t e x t u a l obsession--the i l l u s o r y requirement t h a t
a m o r t i z a t i o n p e r i o d s conform t o some undefined s t a n d a r d of " r e a s o n a b l e n e s s . " See
Provo C i t y Reply/Opp. Memo. p p . 3 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 1 0 . Because t h e concept has no b a s i s i n
t h e o r d i n a n c e , t h e argument w i l l not be taken up h e r e .
3

Again, t h e C i t y c i t e s no a u t h o r i t y for t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t c r e d i t
d e p r e c i a t i o n i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e purposes of an a m o r t i z a t i o n p e r i o d .
4

for

R e g a r d l e s s of how o t h e r p a r t s of t h e formula a r e c a l c u l a t e d , i t i s
i n d i s p u t a b l e t h a t a n e g a t i v e n e t income f i g u r e w i l l always r e s u l t i n an i n f i n i t e
amortization period.
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figures, which do not include depreciation, the result is an openended extension.
The City's problem, of course, is that it did not use the
above net

income

figure consistently,

choosing

to concoct

a

different number for net income in the second instance. See March
8, 2004 Janice Larsen Memo., p. 2, section 6. Even though M&S spent
considerable space highlighting this inconsistency in its first
memorandum, the City still has never explained why it applied two
completely different figures for "net income from the property" in
different parts of the formula, one nearly $60,000 greater than the
other. If the true "net income" is used consistently throughout the
formula, the result of the calculation is an infinite amortization
period.

In short, the problem is not with the inclusion of

depreciation.
negative.

The parties agree that M&S's true net income was

The problem is that Provo City did not like the results

of its own mathematic formula, so it arbitrarily cooked its own
hypothetical "net income" numbers for part of the formula.
C.

The City's New Rationale for Excluding Unprofitable Years
from the Net Income Total Is Contradictory and Unsupported,

In its brief, the City offers another new argument

for

including only 1999 and 2000 in its second method of calculating
"net income," stating that it preferred to use only the periods that
came after the total investment in the property was completed. This
argument has two terminal flaws.
First, this new rationale directly contradicts the explanation
for the decision given by the City's accountant in her memorandum
-22-

of March 8, 2004.

In that memorandum, Ms. Larsen stated that she

included only 1999 and 2000 in her calculation of net income because
"the rental income from periods prior to 1999 would not be an
accurate reflection of expected future rental." See March 8, 2004
Janice Larsen Memo., p. 3, BOA Record Exhibit 26. Now, when faced
with the allegation that the decision was arbitrary and illegal, the
City has changed its story, asserting that figures for 1996-1998
were excluded because M&S's investment was still ongoing in those
years.

Ms. Larsen's explanation was impermissible, as it shows an

unprincipled attempt to divine *expected future rental"--a concept
not found in the ordinance.

The City's new explanation is also

unsupported, since the ordinance says nothing about waiting until
an investment is completed to begin totaling net income. Neither
explanation rests on any principled basis found in the ordinance or
elsewhere.
Secondly, the City's records reflect that M&S's investment in
the property didn't end in 1998. As shown in the City Accountant's
chart, M&S also made capital improvements in 1999. See March 8, 2004
Janice Larsen Memo., p. 2, section 5. Thus, if it is true that the
accountant was using data only from years after the investment was
complete, she should have excluded 1999 from the total. But she did
not. The City's newly adopted rationale for excluding the unprofitable years from its net income total is an afterthought, is
contradicted by the evidence, and is unsupported by the language of
the ordinance.

-23-

The very scheme suggested by the City i s i r r a t i o n a l — s u g g e s t ing t h a t if the home had been operating for 40 years and was
a new t o i l e t and bathroom sink in the 39 th year,

given

the net income

figure would then be c a l c u l a t e d s t a r t i n g only a f t e r the date of the
upgrade.

Not only i s t h e r e no r a t i o n a l reason to perform

the

c a l c u l a t i o n in such a way, t h e r e i s no reason to b e l i e v e t h a t such
was done h e r e . 5
D.

P l a i n t i f f s Are Entitled to an Open-ended Extension as
They Have Provided Clear Evidence of Prejudice.

As a f i n a l argument,

Provo City contends t h a t even i f

the

C i t y ' s d e c i s i o n i s found to be a r b i t r a r y , c a p r i c i o u s , or i l l e g a l ,
M&S must s t i l l show t h a t i t was prejudiced by the decision i n order
to obtain i t s d e s i r e d remedy.

While M&S does not agree with t h e

C i t y ' s exaggerated d e s c r i p t i o n s of the s t r i n g e n c y of t h i s standard,
M&S has met the burden s e t forth in Springville
Better

Community v. City of Springville,
Provo City c i t e s both Springville

Perry City,

Citizens

for

a

1999 UT 25, 979 P. 2d 332. 6
Citizens

and Gardner

v.

2000 UT App 1, 994 P.2d 811, in arguing t h a t the showing

of p r e j u d i c e i s "a d i f f i c u l t — i f not impossible--burden."
in each of those c a s e s ,

However,

the zoning a u t h o r i t i e s were accused of

5

I t should a l s o be n o t e d a g a i n h e r e t h a t M&S d i d have r e n t e r s l i v i n g i n t h e
home and r e c e i v e d some r e n t a l income d u r i n g t h e y e a r s 1996-1998. See F i n a n c i a l
S t a t e m e n t s f o r 1996-1998, a t t a c h e d as E x h i b i t C t o March 26, 2002 A p p l i c a t i o n f o r
A m o r t i z a t i o n , BOA Record E x h i b i t 12.
6

I t i s u n c l e a r whether t h e showing of p r e j u d i c e i s r e q u i r e d i n a p p e a l s from
a l l zoning c a s e s , o r whether t h i s s t a n d a r d a p p l i e s o n l y where t h e a p p e a l a l l e g e s
t h a t p r o c e d u r a l r u l e s were v i o l a t e d .
Without c o n c e d i n g t h a t t h e showing of
p r e j u d i c e i s r e q u i r e d h e r e , where t h e a l l e g a t i o n i s of a s u b s t a n t i v e d e f e c t i n
implementation of an o r d i n a n c e , M&S contends t h a t i t e a s i l y meets t h i s s t a n d a r d .
-24-

having missed

insignificant procedural

challenged decisions.

steps in making their

Thus, the plaintiffs were saddled with the

difficult task of showing that if the minor procedural rules had all
been fulfilled, the outcomes would have been substantively different. That is not the case here. In this case, M&S alleges that the
ordinance was wrongly implemented in a very specific way, which
resulted in a 22-year amortization period.

If the ordinance had

been correctly implemented, using only one proper definition of
"net income from the property," the amortization period would have
been infinite.

Thus, rather than presenting a speculative hypo-

thetical, M&S has suffered a specific miscalculation, resulting in
a specified loss in the use of its property after a certain amount
of time.
This Court has the authority to overrule the determination of
the City, state which of the City's steps were arbitrary, capricious, or illegal, and set forth the results of the formula as if
it had been implemented correctly. See Carrier,

104 P. 3d at 1212 and

122 0 (upholding district court's ruling voiding Planning Commission
decision) ; Wells

v. Bd. of Adjustment

of Salt

Lake City

Corp.,

936

P.2d 1102, 1105 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (vacating Board of Adjustment's
grant of illegal and arbitrary variance) . If the Court finds that
M&S's true "net income from the property" was negative (a fact which
is undisputed), it should mandate an open-ended exemption period
for M&S, since any negative net income will produce that result.
To take such a course would not be to substitute the Court's

-25-

judgment for the City's; it would be to apply the ordinance in the
only way it can rationally and legally be applied.

II.

IT WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT
"TOGETHER WITH ALL CLAIMS AND THEORIES ASSERTED THEREIN.
A.

Plaintiffs Properly Pled Their As-Applied Challenges
in their Complaint.

Plaintiffs'
2000-15

("the

as-applied

challenges

to

Provo City

Ordinance

Ordinance") are clearly stated in the Complaint.

Count One of the Complaint in matter 000403654 states a claim for
"Violations of Utah Constitution" as follows:
Provo City's zoning changes . . . constitute a
taking of Plaintiffs' property without just or due
compensation. The zoning changes are so harsh and
substantial in comparison with the trivial public
benefit, if any, so as to make the zoning changes
confiscatory.
See Complaint, 1 41, attached as Exhibit A. (R. 0014)
The Complaint offers further explanation of this as-applied
challenge:
Provo City's zoning changes, as described above,
violate due process because the imposition of the
zoning changes to the 1310 Home and the 1410 Home do
not bear a relationship to the public health,
safety, welfare or morals. In the alternative, the
changes are more severe and strict than those
necessary to achieve valid police power purposes.
Id. at I 43.
Count Two of the Complaint states a claim for "Unreasonable
Regulation," explaining that:
Provo City's zoning ordinances . . . and the application of those ordinances to the subject properties
is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, has no
reasonably debatable relationship to the public
-26-

health, welfare, safety, or morals, is inconsistent
with surrounding areas and uses, and is more strict
or severe than necessary.
Id.

at I 49.
As stated in the Complaint, Plaintiffs have claims against

Provo City under doctrines of takings law, due process, zoning
abuses, and misapplication of the police power.

Each of these

challenges is brought in the context of Provo City's application of
its Ordinance to the subject properties.

None of them relates to

a facial challenge of the Ordinance, nor to the City's implementation of its amortization formula.
B.

Plaintiffs' As-Applied
Adjudicated.

Challenges

Have

Never

Been

Provo City contends that every claim pled by Plaintiffs in this
consolidated case was either resolved by Anderson
Corp.,

v. Provo

City

or in the Court's ruling on the Cross-Motions for Summary
See

Judgment.

2 005 UT 5, 108 P.3d 701, attached as Exhibit B.

A

brief review of each of these proceedings shows that the as-applied
challenges
Anderson

raised

in

the

complaint

remain

unaddressed.

The

case explicitly purports to rule on only four limited

questions: 1. "Provo City's Authority to Issue Ordinance 2000-15"
(at SI 11); 2. The Ordinance's effect on "Equal Protection And
Uniform Operation of Laws"

(at SI 17); 3. Whether the Ordinance

constitutes a ''Restraint on Alienation" (at SI 26); and 4. Whether
the Ordinance unlawfully burdens the "Right to Travel" (at SI 28) .
The Anderson

court also explicitly characterized the claims before
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it as facial.

Id.

at 8.7

The case does not address any takings,

due process, zoning abuse, or police power challenges in the asapplied context.
The Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment dealt with a different
set of issues, namely "the issue of whether the City's amortization
determination was arbitrary, capricious or illegal."

See

Provo

City's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, p. 2. The lower
Court agreed with this characterization of the issues before it on
summary judgment, writing in its Memorandum Decision that "the
issue in this case is whether the Board of Adjustments correctly
interpreted and applied the Ordinance when using the formula to
calculate Plaintiff's amortization period."

See January 30, 2006

Memorandum Decision, p. 3. The lower Court's final statement of its
ruling remained consistent with that reading of the issues, awarding "summary judgment to Defendant Provo City Corporation and
affirm[ing] the Board of Adjustment decision applying the twentytwo year, three month amortization period to the M&S property."

Id.

at 6.
To summarize the above rulings, the Anderson

case resolved the

facial constitutional challenges to the statute, and the lower
Court's ruling on summary judgment involved the challenge to the
City's application of the amortization formula.
proceedings

Neither of these

addressed the as-applied challenges

7

listed above,

The Court's mention of a stipulation dismissing as-applied claims in the
underlying proceeding did not affect the claims of Plaintiffs in this case.
Anderson,
2 005 UT 5, I 8.
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namely, Plaintiff's takings, due process, zoning abuse, and police
power challenges.

Provo City can point to no ruling, order, or

stipulation that finally resolves any of these as-applied questions.
Because the City is unable to show where Plaintiffs' asapplied challenges have been resolved, it resorts to the argument
that Plaintiffs were on notice that the City hoped to resolve all
pending claims by way of its Motion for Summary Judgment. And yet,
this argument cuts both ways.

At the hearing on January 27, 2006,

the first statement to the Court by Plaintiffs' counsel was to
identify the two main issues remaining in the lawsuit, i.e.,
"as-applied" and "amortization," and to advise the Court that only
the amortization issues, and not the as-applied issues, were before
the Court. Provo City raised no objection to Plaintiffs' statement
of the issues.

If the City's position regarding the timeliness of

objections is to be followed, Provo must live with its failure to
raise an objection at that time.

The argument of who best framed

the substance of the motions and who should have objected first is
at best a draw.
This is more fully proven by a review of the arguments in the
parties' briefs on the summary judgment motions.

At no point did

either party raise any arguments on the issues of takings, due
process, zoning, or police power. Neither did these questions ever
come up at oral argument.

Substantive legal claims cannot be

disposed of merely by a clause in a legal memorandum that purports
to include the claims but does not even address their substance.
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Plaintiffs' as-applied challenges to the Ordinance have never been
finally addressed by this or any other court.

Therefore, the

proposed order purporting to dismiss Plaintiffs' remaining claims
should be rejected.
C.

The As-Applied Issue Must Be Determined Under the Proper
Procedural Standards of Rule 56 or Rule 12•

Provo City makes its first attempt to address the substance of
Plaintiffs' as-applied challenge in its response to Plaintiff's
objections to the proposed order. Legal arguments on the merits of
Plaintiffs' claims are improper in such a forum.

Any attempt to

resolve the merits of Plaintiffs' as-applied challenge must take
the form of a Motion under the Rules of Civil Procedure, namely a
Motion to Dismiss under Utah R. Civ. P. 12, or a Motion for Summary
Judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 56. Plaintiffs should not have been
required to respond to the City's arguments on the substantive merit
of their claims in a dispute over the form of a proposed order. It
suffices to recognize that Plaintiffs' as-applied claims exist, and
remain undecided.
III. INTERVENORS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO INTERVENE.
Intervenors' motion to intervene should have been denied for
at least three reasons.

First and foremost, the Intervenors lack

standing to intervene because they have not alleged, and cannot prove,
any special damages peculiar to themselves which will result from the
proposed settlement or from their (untrue) allegations that zoning
ordinances will be violated.

Second, the motion to intervene is
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untimely.

Finally, the motion fails to satisfy the requirements of

Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
A.

The Interveners Lack Standing Because They Have Not
Alleged, and Cannot Prove, Any Special Damages over and
above the Alleged Public Injury Which May Be Caused by the
Purported Violation of the Zoning Ordinances.

The Intervenors claim that the proposed settlement will violate
applicable zoning ordinances and "affect[ ] the character and property
values of surrounding residential properties and

inappropriately

increase[s] the traffic on neighborhood streets." Intervenors' Memo.,
at 9.

This allegation of general damages, however, is insufficient

to provide the legal standing required for the Intervenors to join
this lawsuit.
In Perper

v. Pima County,

600 P.2d 52 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979), the

Court of Appeals of Arizona decided a case nearly identical to this
one.

In Perper,

plaintiffs filed suit against Pima County alleging

that the County had improperly denied their request for rezoning and
a variance.

Prior to trial, the parties reached a settlement, and a

judgment was entered rezoning the plaintiffs' property pursuant to the
settlement agreement. Shortly thereafter, neighboring property owners
filed a petition that requested an order "setting aside the [ ]
judgment, setting the earlier case for trial, and permitting appellants to intervene in it."

Id.

at 53.

In support of their petition

for intervention, the neighboring property owners made an argument
identical to that of the Intervenors here:
The petition alleges that appellants own property affected
by the outcome of the earlier case in that the rezoning
would decrease property values in the whole area, there
would be increased traffic and noise, and the residential
atmosphere and scenery would be substantially destroyed.
-31-

Id.

The court dismissed the petition and the neighboring property

owners appealed.

On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the

dismissal of the petition and held:
The board of supervisors had authority to agree to the
consent judgment in the earlier case.
Had the board
originally granted the appellees' rezoning request despite
appellants' objections at the public hearing, appellants
would have had no standing to maintain a suit to nullify
the variance. An adjacent property owner who suffers no
special damage from the granting of a variance cannot seek
judicial review of an administrative decision to grant a
variance.
To be aggrieved, the plaintiff must have
sustained damage peculiar to himself. Appellants' petition
alleges only general economic and aesthetic losses.
Id.

at 54 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
The same is true in this case. Provo City has authority to agree

to the agreed-upon settlement terms. The Intervenors did not allege,
and cannot prove, any special damages peculiar to themselves. Rather,
they have merely alleged general economic damages and aesthetic
losses.

Utah courts also hold that such general allegations are

insufficient to entitle an individual to maintain an action for an
alleged violation of a zoning ordinance.

In Culbertson

County

2001 UT 108, 44 P.3d 642,

Commissioners

of

Salt

Lake

County,

v.

Board

of

the Utah Supreme Court reconfirmed this basic rule:
A private individual must both allege and prove special
damages peculiar to himself in order to entitle him to
maintain an action to enjoin violation of a zoning ordinance . His damage must be over and above the public injury
which may be caused by the violation of the zoning ordinance.
Id.

at 657 (emphasis in original) (quoting

Padjen

v. Shipley,

553 P.2d

938, 939 (Utah 1976)).
The Intervenors have not and cannot allege any special damage
peculiar to themselves. The most they can even allege (and even this
they could never likely prove) is general damage to the public in
-32-

general, such as increased traffic or the like.8 Such allegations are
insufficient to give the Intervenors standing under the rules set
forth in Culbertson,

Perper, and other cases. The motion to intervene

therefore should have been denied as a matter of law.
B.

The Motion to Intervene Was Untimely.

Rule

2 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil

procedure for intervention.

Procedure governs the

The first requirement under both Rule

24(a) and Rule 24(b) is that the intervenor make a ''timely application."

Rule 24(a) and (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. "Use

of the word 'timely' in the Rule requires that the timeliness of the
application be determined under the facts and circumstances of each
particular case, and in the sound discretion of the court."
Ins.

Group v. Doman, 114 P.2d 1130, 1131 (Utah 1989) (quoting

v. Real

Estate

In Republic

Serv.,

Republic
Jenner

659 P.2d 1072, 1073-74 (Utah 1983)).

Insurance

to intervene as untimely.

Group,

the district court denied a motion

On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed

the denial of the motion to intervene and held:
The "facts and circumstances" of this case are as follows:
Defendant knew this action was pending prior to his attempt
to intervene. His motion for intervention stated, "Movant
had previously been under the impression that defendants
were adequately represented by counsel and their interests
were adequately protected and represented." His motion was
not filed until every fact necessary for a ruling on the
motion for summary judgment had been deemed admitted and a
ruling had been requested on the motion. Given these facts
and circumstances, i.e. , Duke's apparent notice and opportunity to intervene at an earlier stage of the proceeding and
the ripeness of the case for summary judgment at the time
the motion to intervene was made, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
Id.

at 1131 (emphasis added).

8
M&S specifically denies that the proposed settlement or M&S's use of the
property causes any harm to anyone, specific or general.
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The same reasoning applies here. The Intervenors knew that this
lawsuit was pending for over two years prior to filing their motion
to intervene.

They apparently were content to have Provo City

represent their interests during that time.

M&S and Provo City had

invested substantial time and resources in reaching a resolution.
Then, nearly three years later and on the eve of settlement, the
Intervenors filed their motion to intervene because they did not like
the agreed upon outcome of the dispute.

It was simply too late.

Given the Intervenors' knowledge and opportunity to intervene at an
earlier stage of the proceeding, and the fact that the parties had
reached a settlement, the lower court should have denied the motion
to intervene as untimely.
C.

The Intervenors Cannot
Matter of Right.

Intervene in this Lawsuit

as a

Intervention of right is governed by Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

It provides:

Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene;
or (2) when the applicant claims an interest
relating to the property or transaction which is
the subject of the action and he is so situated
that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest, unless the applicant's
interest is adequately represented by existing
parties.
In addition to their motion being untimely, the Intervenors
cannot satisfy either of the tests for intervention of right.
First,

there

is

no

applicable

unconditional right to intervene."
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statute

which

''confers

an

The Intervenors argue that Utah

Code Ann. § 10-9-1002 (1) (a) confers such a right, but they are
mistaken.

Section 10-9-1002(1)(a) provides:

A municipality or any owner of real estate within the
municipality in which violations of this chapter or
ordinances enacted under the authority of this chapter
occur or are about to occur may, in addition to other
remedies provided by law, institute:
(i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any other
appropriate actions; or
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove
the unlawful building, use, or act.
Although

Section

10-9-1002 (1) (a) allows property

owners to

institute various proceedings and actions when an alleged zoning
violation occurs or is about to occur, it does not "confer [ ] an
unconditional right to intervene."

An example of a statute which

confers such a right is 28 U.S.C. § 2347.

This section confers an

unconditional right to intervene in the context of federal agency
orders.

It states, in relevant part: "Communities, associations,

corporations, firms and individuals, whose interests are affected by
the order of the agency, may intervene in any proceeding to review the
order. "

In stark contrast, Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1002(1) (a) fails to

even address intervention.

The Intervenors may attempt to institute

a separate lawsuit under Section 10-9-1002(1) (a) to enforce the zoning
ordinances, but they do not have the unconditional right to intervene
in this lawsuit.
Additionally,

the

Intervenors

cannot

intervention of right under Rule 24(a)(2).

satisfy

the

test

for

First, the Intervenors do

not have an interest in this dispute or in the properties that are the
subject of this dispute.

As shown above, their alleged interest in

enforcing the zoning ordinances and maintaining "the character and
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property values of surrounding residential properties" is insufficient
under Utah law to justify intervention.

The Intervenors have not

alleged, and cannot prove, any special damages peculiar to themselves.
Moreover, the Intervenors' interests have been and are represented by
Provo City. Provo City's interests in enforcing its zoning ordinances
are aligned with its residents.

If the Intervenors did not believe

that Provo City adequately represented their interests, then they
should have requested intervention over two years earlier, when this
lawsuit commenced. Finally, the motion to intervene is untimely.
supra

See

Section II. The Court should not have allowed the Intervenors

to wait over two years and then intervene on the eve of a final
settlement.
The Intervenors argue that the proposed settlement violates
certain procedures required by Provo City Code.

This argument,

however, fails to recognize that Provo City has agreed to the terms
of a settlement in an effort to settle a lawsuit which challenges the
validity of the City's zoning ordinances. If the proposed settlement
takes place, Provo City was not giving up something for nothing.
Rather, the City was making sure that M&S received only that to which
it is legally entitled under Provo City Ordinances.

In return, M&S

agreed to give up its challenge to the validity of the ordinances.
The Intervenors' untimely (and untrue) argument that the settlement
would result in general economic damages and aesthetic losses does not
justify intervention.
In summary, the Intervenors should not have been permitted to
intervene in this lawsuit as a matter of right.
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CONCLUSION
Following extensive negotiations that had extended over more
than two years and that resulted in a settlement of all issues that
both M&S and Provo City believed were in their respective best
interests, the lower court, in error, allowed Intervenors to
intervene even though, as a matter of law, they have no standing in
this case. Provo City then reversed course in response to political
pressure applied by the Intervenors and adopted a political and
highly improper application of its Owner Occupant Ordinance to
M&S's property, arrived at through clearly arbitrary, capricious,
and illegal manipulation of provisions of the Ordinance. The lower
court, in error, affirmed the City's determination. The lower court
also erroneously dismissed plaintiffs'

xx

as-applied" claims that

were pleaded but never briefed, argued, or otherwise decided by the
lower court.
This Court should reverse the judgment of the lower court and
order that, under the Ordinance and the undisputed facts, M&S is
entitled to an infinite period of time to recoup its investment, and
is therefore exempt from the owner-occupant provisions of the
Ordinance. In the alternative, this Court should reverse the lower
court's order allowing intervention and should remand this case for
consideration of the "as-applied" claims.
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DATED this 5& day of November, 2006.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Reed L. Martineau
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants M&S
Cox Investments, LC, Mervyn Cox and
Sue Cox
N \17945\ll\Appeal\Brief of Appellant - Final ll-29-06-Marked-3 wpd

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the *? V day of November, 2 006, I
caused the original and nine copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLANT to be sent to the Clerk of the Appellate Court of the
State of Utah, and two copies to each of the following:
Mr. Jody K Burnett
WILLIAMS 8c HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Post Office Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678
Mr. David C. Dixon
Assistant City Attorney
Provo City
351 West Center Street
Post Office Box 1849
Provo, Utah 84603
by United States Mail, postage prepaid.

ADDENDUM
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.

Provo City Ordinance 2000-15 (R. 0433)

2.

Summary Judgment (R. 1204)

3.

Complaint (R. 0014)

4.

Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 2005 UT 5, 108 P.3d 701

Tabl

ORDINANCE 2000-15
SHORT TITLE:
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING CHAPTER 14.30 (SUPPLEMENTARY RESIDENTIAL
OVERLAY ZONE) OF THE PROVO CITY CODE TO REQUIRE OWNER
OCCUPANCY IN ORDER TO HAVE AN ACCESSORY DWELLING UNIT AND TO REGULATE
NONCONFORMING DWELLINGS.
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ORDINANCE 2000-15
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING CHAPTER 14.30 (SUPPLEMENTARY
RESIDENTIAL OVERLAY ZONE) OF THE PRO VO CITY CODE TO RJEQU1RE
OWNER OCCUPANCY IN ORDER TO HAVE AN ACCESSORY DWELLING
UNIT AND TO REGULATE NONCONFORMING DWELLINGS.
WHEREAS, it is proposed that Chapter 14.30 of the Provo City Code be modified to require
owner occupancy in order to have an accessory dwelling unit and to regulate nonconforming
dwellings; and,
WHEREAS, on October 13,1999 and January 26,2000 the Planning Commission held duly
noticed public hearings to consider two proposals submitted by the applicants (denominated as
Proposed Text Amendments #land #2) and recommended that a third alternative proposal be
adopted (denominated as Proposed Text Amendment #3); and,
WHEREAS, the Municipal Council staff and City Attorney' s office have developed a further
alternative proposal (denominated as Proposed Text Amendment #4); and,
WHEREAS, on April 4,2000 the Municipal Council held a duly noticed public hearing to
receive public comment and ascertain the facts regarding this matter, which facts and comments are
found in the hearing record; and,
WHEREAS, after considering the Planning Commission's recommendation, and facts and
comments presented to the Municipal Council, the Council discussed changes to the proposed text
amendments and developed another proposed amendment as set forth below; and,
WHEREAS, the Council finds (i) the proposed amendment carries out the policy and intent
of the City's General Plan; (ii) the Planning and Zoning Title of Provo City should be amended as
set forth below and (iii) such ordinance^imendment reasonably furthers the health, safety and general
welfare of the citizens of Provo City.
NOW, THEREFORE, be it ordained by the Municipal Council of Provo City, Utah, as
follows:
PART I:
Chapter 14.30 of the Provo City Code is hereby amended as follows:
Chapter 14,30. S - Supplementary Residential Overlay Zone.
14.30.010. Purpose and Objectives.
14.30.020. Use in Combination.
14.30.030. Permitted Uses.
14.30.040. Development Standards.

14.30.050. Area of Zone.
14.30.060. Petition for Zone Adoption.
14.30.070. Parking Requirements.
14.30.080. Nonconforming Uses.
14.30.010. Purpose and Objectives.
The purpose of the Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay Zone is to recognize the unique
character of Provo City as a "university community" and to accommodate supplementary living
accommodations in some appropriate single family residential areas of the community. These
provisions are intended to meet community demands for residential accommodations for
semitransient residents in areas of the community adjacent to major educational and institutional
uses. This overlay zone is designed to provide an alternative living environment for said
semi-transient residents to that normally found within the higher density multiple residential zones.
The (S) overlay zone will therefore protect and enhance the desirable aesthetic characteristics of the
underlying single family residential zone. An R-l zone with a Supplementary Residential (S)
Overlay as described in this Chapter is intended to continue the very low density of an R-1 zone. The
sole function of the overlay is to permit alternate methods of housing the occupancy otherwise
permitted in an
R-l zone.
14.30.020. Use in Combination.
(1) The Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay Zone may be used only in combination with
the R-l (Single Family Residential) Zone as designated herein. The provisions of the (S) Overlay
Zone shall become supplementary to the provisions of the zone with which it is combined. The (S)
Overlay Zone shall not be applied to any land area as an independent zone.
14.30.030. Permitted Uses.
Uses permitted in the Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay Zone shall be limited to those
uses listed as permitted uses in an Rl Zone with the following additional permitted uses:
(1) Accessory Dwelling Unit: For purposes of the Supplementary Residential Overlay Zone
only, a structure which is in all respects by design, construction, and appearance a single family
residence, qualifying as such within an Rl Zone, may in addition have an accessory dwelling unit
constructed therein if the accessory dwelling unit:
(a) Is located in a basement or in a second level above ground level and there is a
useable interior connection between the accessory dwelling unit and the main structure; and,
(b) Does not alter the appearance of the structure as a single family residence, and
does not cause the structure within which the accessory dwelling is located to resemble in
any degree a side-by-side, side-to-back, back-to-back, or other type of duplex unit. A
structure having an accessory dwelling unit under the provisions of this Section shall have
no more than two (2) kitchens within the structure.
(2) Occupancy: For purposes of a one family dwelling with an accessory dwelling unit, which
is authorized by and conforms to the requirements stated above in this Section, the following
occupancy rules shall apply:
(a) One of the dwelling units within the structure shall be occupied by:
(i) One (1) person living alone; or

(ii) The head of household and all persons related to the head of household
by marriage or adoption as a parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, brother, sister,
uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, great-grandparent or great-grandchild. For purposes of
this paragraph, two (2) or more of these persons must share the legal relationship of
husband and wife, or parent and child or grandparent and child. Such parent or
grandparent must actually reside in the subject dwelling.
(b) The remaining dwelling unit within the structure shall be occupied by no more
than four (4) related or unrelated persons
(c) One of the dwelling units within the structure shall be occupied by the owner of
the property. Owner occupancy shall not be required when:
(i) The owner has abona fide? temporary absence of three (3) years or less for
activities such as temporary job assignments*- sabbaticals, or voluntary service.
Indefinite jperiods of absen%from.the, home shall not qualify for this exception.
(ii) The owner^rplfc^
nursing home, assisted living facility
Qr.Qther.similar facility,:
(3)! Owner occupano^|ass defined inJhis section shall mean:
(i) ahuman_b^gjjgh^osjessej^^m4Kan,fifty (50)~percentownersliip,in
thedwelFngai^iM^
of the owner; or

r^ideng©fsrsMi»^aimg!
14.30.040. Development Standards.
All development standards required in the Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay Zone shall
be the same as those required by the provisions of the underlying zone with which the (S) zone is
combined.
14.30.050. Area of Zone.
The Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay Zone shall be applied to a land area ten (10)
acres or more which contains at least forty (40) existing dwelling structures, and which is at least
fifty (50) percent developed. The land area shall be free from islands or peninsulas or any other
unreasonable boundary line configurations. Additions to an existing (S) Overlay Zone shall be by
petition which conforms to all provisions of this Chapter except acreage, and number of dwellings
14.30.060. Petition for Zone Adoption.
(1) Property owners may request application of the Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay
Zone to any land meeting the minimum area and boundary requirements by a petition in
conformance with the provisions of Section 14 02 020, Provo City Code signed by not less than
seventy (70) percent of the property owners within the area requested for said zoning amendment.
Said petition shall indicate that all signers are proponents of the amendment being proposed.
(2) For purposes of this Section:
(a) There shall be one (1) petition signature for each legally created lot, provided,
however, that no more than fifty (50) percent of the signatures on any petition shall come
from any one (1) petitioner;
(b) In the event a fee title owner and a contract purchaser shall disagree on the

signing of a petition for purposes of this Chapter, a contract purchaser not in default shall
have the right to sign a petition, and
(c) Only an owner or contract purchaser, acting personally or through a written power
of attorney, may sign a petition
14,30.070. Parking Requirements.
Parking requirements for the Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay Zone shall be as
required by the provisions of Section 14 37 090, Provo City Code, except that any single dwelling
with an occupied accessory dwelling shall have at least two (2) additional off-street parking spaces,
for a total of four (4) spaces. In no case shall the number of off-street parking spaces be less than the
number of vehicles being maintained on the premises. If the owner wishes to rent to more unrelated
individuals than there are supplementary parking spaces, this shall only be allowed under the
following conditions:
(1) Owners shall take the initiative in enforcing compliance by tenants with the limitations
imposed herein upon the number of vehicles allowed their tenants and if a tenant fails to comply
with such limitations after appropriate notice, owners shall forthwith evict such tenant;
(2) Owners shall maintain a list of all tenants, together with the make and license plate
number of their respective vehicles, which owners shall provide to Provo City upon request;
(3) Owners shall enter into a covenant with Provo City that they will not rent to tenants
having a total number of vehicles in excess of the total number of supplementary parking spaces
(over and above the two spaces required for the resident family) provided by owners, without the
prior written consent of Provo City, which covenant shall be binding on all subsequent owners of
the subject apartments.
14.30.080. Nonconforming Uses.
(1) Nonconforming uses relating to occupancy arc extinguished by adoption after January
6
1,1083, of a Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay Zone. 9J^^S^^?Sk
% e fiJiM^°?^IS
^subparagraph(2) ofihis'section, every dwellmgunit in the (3$j(i^
requirements of this Chapter*
(2)No3iwithstandmg the provisionsjof Chapter 14.36 ofthisTffie, a one-family dwellingwifh
an accessory d ^ i f i f l ^ ^
which v/as legall^
established shall not be required to c o n f o m ^
stan%d|oJ^^
apgly.foran extensibnof time to compl£'^m&^
subject
to the'provisions of Section 14.3G.09& of this jChapter;
14.30.090. Termination of Nonconforming Uses - Recovery of Investment
(1) The Community Development Director or his designee shall grant an owner of property
affected by Subsection 14.30.080(2) of this Chapter an extension of the time required to conform
with such section if:
(a) the owner:
(i) by August 4,2000 files a notice of intent to apply for a time extension as,
provided in this section; and
(ii) by April 4,2001 files a complete application for an extension of time as
provided in this section.

(b); the pwner^s
of :eviderice that:!
IlitHenonQonformi
esfabj;ished||nci

extension of time demonstrates by a preponderan;^

unablej^^
property

alpropi^lasl®^

1:::^^:::::::>C^::::::u::W»:s»:u:»::::::::h:::::l^i:ui^tnu»l.u»;u»t::»»s«::

alli&liiifi^^
(jililliP^

siei^^

:»;y;:x::s*:::::y:Kt::;:Rt::s::;i:-.;:-.::::::::::::::::--.::::t:::::-.:::::::::::::t:

SillSiiSiiiS
PARTn:
A. Whenever the provisions of this ordinance conflict with the provisions of any other
ordinance or part thereof enacted before this ordinance, the provisions of this ordinance shall prevail.
B. This ordinance and its various sections, clauses and paragraphs are hereby declared to be
severable. If any part, sentence, clause or phrase is adjudged to be unconstitutional or invalid, the.
remainder of the ordinance shall not be affected thereby.
C. The Municipal Council hereby directs that the official copy of the Provo City Code be
updated to reflect the provisions enacted by this ordinance.
D. This ordinance shall take effect immediately after it has been posted or published as
required by law.
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Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
JODY K BURNETT (A0499)
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P. O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678
Phone: (801) 521-5678
Fax: (801) 364-4500

4-M-0(g_^gpeputy

DAVID C. DLXON (0890)
ASSISTANT CITY ATTORNEY
PROVO CITY
351 West Center Street
Provo, UT 84601
Phone: (801) 852-6141
Fax: (801) 852-6150
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

M&S INVESTMENTS, L.L.C., a Utah limited
liability company, MERVYN COX AND
SUSAN COX,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiffs,
Consolidated
Civil No. 000403654
PROVO CITY CORPORATION,
Judge Steven L. Hansen
Defendant.
This matter came before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Steven L. Hansen
presiding, for consideration of cross-motions for summary judgment on all of the claims
asserted in this consolidated action. A hearing on the motions was held before die Court
on January 27, 2006. The plaintiffs were represented by Reed L. Martineau and Ryan B.
Bell. Defendant was represented by Jody K Burnett and David C. Dixon.

Following the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under
advisement, and having reviewed the legal memoranda and exhibits submitted by the
parties and having considered the arguments of counsel, issued its Memorandum Decision
dated January 30, 2006, granting defendant Provo City's Motion for Summary Judgment
and denying plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. Pursuant to that Memorandum
Decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Defendant Provo City's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted

on the basis that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the Board of Adjustment's
decision was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal and was supported by substantial evidence
in the record as more fully set forth in the Memorandum Decision of January 30, 2006.
2.

Plaintiffs M&S Investments, L.L.C., Mervyn Cox and Sue Cox's Motion for

Summary Judgment is hereby denied for the reasons more fully set forth in the
Memorandum Decision of January 30, 2006.
3.

Based on the foregoing orders and for the reasons more fully set forth

above, the plaintiffs3 Complaint, together with all claims and theories asserted therein in
this consolidated action, is hereby dismissed, with prejudice and upon the merits. All
parties are to bear their own respective costs and attorney's fees.
DATED this

j ^ d a y of

/fy#cf

2006.
BY THE COURT:

126718 1

Steven LTHansen
District Court Judge
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REED L. MARTINEAU (2106)^
KEITH A. CALL (A67081/
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

to s i\53ra

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

M&S INVESTMENTS, L.L.C., a
Utah Limited Liability
Company, MERVYN COX AND SUSAN
COX,

COMPLAINT
(JURY DEMANDED)

Plaintiffs,

civil NO. (2_iOM3b^}f

vs.
PROVO CITY CORPORATION,

Judge
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Defendant.
Plaintiffs allege as follow:
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

Plaintiff M&S Investments, L.L.C. (*M&S" ) is a Utah

Limited Liability Company that does business within the State of
Utah.
2.
Utah.

Mervyn and Sue Cox are husband and wife and reside in
They are also the owners of M&S.

3.

Defendant Provo City Corporation is a Utah municipal

corporation.

4.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction of this case

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1).
5.

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. §§ 78-13-1 and 78-13-7.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
6.

M&S is the owner of two pieces of property located

within Provo.

A home is located on each piece of property.

One

home is located at 1310 North 900 East (the m1310 Home"), and the
other home is located at 1410 North 900 East (the *1410 Home'') .
Both homes are in close proximity to and in walking distance from
the Brigham Young University campus.
7.

M&S purchased the 1310 Home in the summer of 1996. M&S

purchased the home for the purpose of providing a place to live
and study for Mervyn and Sue Cox's children and grandchildren, as
well as other relatives and tenants, while those children,
grandchildren, and other tenants attended Brigham Young
University or other schools located in Utah Valley.
8.

When M&S purchased the 1310 Home, it was located within

a Provo zoning district that allowed student housing and that did
not require an owner to occupy the home.
9.

In order to comply with Provo's then-existing zoning

ordinances that would allow more individuals to live in the home,
M&S undertook to remodel the 1310 Home to add a second story
apartment.

Adding the second story allowed M&S to activate what
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is known as the *S-overlay" provision in the Provo City zoning
ordinances.

By activating the S-overlay, M&S could house more

individuals in the 1310 Home.

No owner was required to occupy

any part of the home.
10.

Accordingly, M&S applied to Provo for a building permit

to allow it to construct a second story on the 1310 Home.

Provo

approved and issued the building permit.
11.

M&S spent a total of over $684,000.00 to purchase the

1310 Home and to remodel it in a manner that would allow it to
take advantage of the S-overlay zone.

The remodeling was

completed in 1997.
12.

After the remodeling was completed on the 1310 Home,

M&S housed certain relatives and others in the 1310 Home.

These

arrangements were at all relevant times in full compliance with
the applicable Provo City zoning ordinances.
13.
Home.

In about September 1999, M&S also purchased the 1410

M&S purchased the 1410 Home to meet Brigham Young

University housing regulations which do not permit single male
BYU students to reside under the same roof as single female BYU
students.

M&S therefore purchased the 1410 Home to house male

children, grandchildren, and other male tenants while the 1310
Home was to be used to house female children, grandchildren, and
other tenants.
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14.

M&S has paid a total of over $226,000 to purchase and

improve the 1410 Home.
15.

At the time M&S purchased the 1410 Home, applicable

Provo City zoning ordinances allowed single students to live in
the home.
16.
Home.

No owner was required to occupy any part of the home.
M&S has housed certain relatives and others in the 1410

These arrangements were at all relevant times in full

compliance with the applicable Provo City zoning ordinances.
17.

At some unknown point in time, and without notice to

M&S or Mervyn or Sue Cox, Provo changed applicable ordinances or
regulations relating to who could live in certain portions of the
1310 Home and the 1410 Home.

Previously, M&S was permitted to

house in part of each home a * family" not exceeding one person
living alone or two or more persons related by blood within five
degrees of consanguinity, along with certain other restrictions.
Without any notice, Provo City changed that ordinance to require
that one of the dwelling units in each home be occupied only by a
head of household and persons related to the head of household by
marriage or adoption as parent, child, grandparent, grandchild,
brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, great grandparent or
great grandchild, with certain other restrictions.

These more

recent and more strict * family" requirements will be referred to
as the "Family-Only Requirement."
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18.

On April 4, 2000, Provo City amended the *S-Overlay"

provisions of its city ordinances by adopting Ordinance 2000-15.
The amendment effectively ^down-zones" the 1310 Home and 1410
Home to require an owner of each home to occupy each home. This
ordinance will be referred to as the "Owner-Occupant Ordinance."
19.

M&S, a limited liability company, is an entity that

cannot qualify to * occupy" either home nor can it satisfy the
Family-Only Requirement.
20.

Provo City adopted the Family-Only Requirement and the

Owner-Occupant Ordinance without permitting fair or adequate
input from the citizens of Provo City and, more particularly,
from the owners of property that are affected by the zoning
change.
21.

For example, in about October or November of 1999,

Provo City's planning commission recommended the creation of a
"citizen's ad hoc committee" to study a proposed Owner-Occupant
Ordinance.

Provo City formed a committee, but appointed people

to serve on the committee who did not fairly represent the
community.

The committee was, instead, made up of persons

appointed by Provo City that Provo City knew would favor the
zoning change and would not study it in an objective manner.
22.

In about January or February, 2000, the Provo City

planning commission held a meeting at which, for the first time,
the purported "findings" of the ad hoc committee were disclosed

to Plaintiffs and others.

The purported "findings" favored

adoption of an Owner-Occupant Ordinance.
23.

Plaintiffs and other interested citizens were not given

an opportunity to read, study, or evaluate the purported findings
of the committee.

Instead, they were told by the planning

commission that the meeting would be adjourned for fifteen
minutes, after which Plaintiffs and other interested citizens who
might oppose the purported findings would be required to respond
to such findings.

Plaintiffs and other interested citizens had

no bona fide opportunity to review, critique, or give input to
the purported findings in any meaningful way.
24.

The Owner-Occupant Ordinance purports to take effect

over a limited period of time, in a purported, but flawed,
attempt to allow home owners to recoup their investments on their
properties.

This ""amortization provision" notwithstanding, M&S

has suffered a taking of its property by Provo City without
compensation.
25.

The Owner-Occupant Ordinance effectively makes it

impossible for M&S to use either the 1310 Home or the 1410 Home
to house single students and other tenants, which was and is the
very purpose for which these homes were purchased and improved by
M&S.
26.

The Owner-Occupant Ordinance allows other property

owners to use their properties in the same way and for the same
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purposes that are denied to Plaintiffs, simply because of the
place of residence of the property owner.

The Owner-Occupant

Ordinance thus requires that Plaintiffs discontinue a previously
lawful and permitted use of their properties not because of their
use of the properties, but because of their place of residence.
27.

The Owner-Occupant Ordinance and Family-Only

Requirement, as applied to the 1310 Home and the 1410 Home, serve
no legitimate public purpose.
28.

The purported "justifications" for the Owner-Occupant

Ordinance and Family-Only Requirement include such things as
preserving the family character of the neighborhood, preserving
property values, and eliminating on-street parking problems.
29.

Because of their location and the nature of the

surrounding property, the 1310 Home and the 1410 Home are not
practical, suitable or realistic for single family or owneroccupied residences.
30.

The 1310 Home and the 1410 Home are fronted by 900

East, which is a major, four-lane (plus a center turning lane)
thoroughfare through Provo City.

The properties are both located

in an area that is dedicated primarily to commercial and highdensity housing uses.
31.

A parking lot and strip mall lay directly south of the

1310 Home.

Other businesses and uses in the immediate vicinity

of the subject properties include the following: restaurants,
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schools, church, public park, parking areas, and high density
student housing.
32.

Directly across the street from the 1310 Home and the

1410 Home are an abandoned supermarket and on-campus (BYU)
student dormitories in which hundreds, and probably thousands, of
BYU students are housed.
33.

Within one mile of the 1310 Home and the 1410 Home and

on or just off 900 East, there is also a BYU laundry facility,
more high density student housing, the LDS Missionary Training
Center in which thousands of college-age missionaries are housed,
the LDS temple, a health center, a conference center, a water
tank and other intense uses.

Between 800 North and approximately

2100 North on 900 East, a span of approximately two miles, there
are no more than a half dozen or so homes that have any
resemblance to a single family home. All of the other properties
along this span of 900 East are dedicated to much more intense
uses.
34.

Both the 1310 Home and the 1410 Home have sufficient

off-street parking to meet all the needs of the occupants and
visitors of each respective property.
35.

Provo City's zoning changes affecting the 1310 Home and

the 1410 Home severely damage Plaintiffs by making their
properties of relatively little value and depriving them the use
for which the property was purchased, namely, student housing for

family members and other tenants.

These properties are

irreplaceable for such purposes, since there is very little or no
property that is similarly situated that could be used to replace
the 1310 Home and the 1410 Home.
36.

Plaintiffs have been damaged in that, among other

things, the value of the subject properties has been
significantly diminished.

At all times material to this action,

a substantial market has existed for the development and/or sale
of the subject properties as student housing properties.
37.

In adopting the Owner-Occupant Ordinance, in which

identical uses of property are permitted or denied based on
ownership of the property, Provo City has exceeded the powers
granted to municipalities by the State of Utah to regulate land
uses.
38.

There is a bona fide, actual, and justiciable

controversy existing between the parties herein.

Plaintiffs have

no adequate remedy at law, and there is an actual, practical and
present need for declaratory and injunctive relief because,
unless enjoined, Provo's actions will continue to result in a
loss of Plaintiffs' substantial rights to the use and enjoyment
of their property.
39.

Plaintiffs have employed the undersigned attorneys to

enforce their rights, and have agreed to pay the undersigned
attorneys a reasonable fee for their services.

COUNT ONE
(Violations of Utah Constitution)
40.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all prior

allegations of this Complaint.
41.

Provo City's zoning changes, as described above,

constitute a taking of Plaintiffs' property without just or due
compensation.

The zoning changes are so harsh and substantial in

comparison with the trivial public benefit, if any, so as to make
the zoning changes confiscatory.
42.

Provo City has rejected Plaintiffs1 suggestion that the

1310 Home and the 1410 Home be excluded from the zoning changes
that have occurred.
43.

Provo City's zoning changes, as described above,

violate due process because the imposition of the zoning changes
to the 1310 Home and the 1410 Home do not bear a relationship to
the public health, safety, welfare or morals.

In the

alternative, the changes are more severe and strict than those
necessary to achieve valid police power purposes.
44.

Provo City's actions have also deprived Plaintiffs of

property without due process of law in that Provo City's actions
have been arbitrarily and capriciously applied to Plaintiffs.
45.

Provo City's actions, while depriving Plaintiffs of

property without due process, have resulted and, unless enjoined,
will continue to result, in substantial and irreparable harm to
Plaintiffs, including denial to Plaintiffs of the opportunity

otherwise available to them to use their property for student
housing purposes.
46.

Provo City's zoning changes, as described above, are a

violation of Article I, §§ 7 and 22 of the Utah Constitution.
47.

Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that the Provo

City zoning changes, as described above, either do not apply to
the 1310 Home or the 1410 Home or in the alternative, Plaintiffs
are entitled to payment of compensation from Provo City.
COUNT TWO
(Unreasonable Regulation)
48.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all prior

allegations of this Complaint.
49.

Provo City's zoning ordinances (as described above) and

the application of those ordinances to the subject properties is
arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, has no reasonably
debatable relationship to the public health, welfare, safety, or
morals, is inconsistent with surrounding areas and uses, and is
more strict or severe than necessary.
50.

Because of their location, the subject properties are

unsuitable for use for owner-occupied residential purposes.
COUNT THREE
(Ultra Vires)
51.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all prior

allegations of this Complaint.
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52.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-401 et seq. empowers

municipalities to regulate the use of land, subject to
limitations.

No Utah statute allows municipalities to regulate

the ownership of land.
53.

Provo City's Owner-Occupant Ordinance, in permitting or

denying identical uses of land based on the residence of the
owner or its status as an entity, exceeds the scope of the power
delegated to Provo City to regulate land uses pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 10-9-401 et seq. or pursuant to any other statute.
54.

Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that the

Owner-Occupant Ordinance is unenforceable as exceeding the power
of Provo City to regulate land uses.
COUNT FOUR
(Declaratory Judgment)
55.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all prior

allegations of this Complaint.
56.

Provo City purports to rely on Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-

408 as authority for the * amortization provision" of its OwnerOccupant Ordinance.
57.

To the extent Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-408 purports to

allow Provo City to adopt its Owner-Occupant Ordinance, the
statute is unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiffs.
58.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seq. and Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure 57, Plaintiffs are entitled to a
declaration that Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-408 is unconstitutional as

applied to them in this case and that the Owner-Occupant
Ordinance and the Family-Only Requirement are unlawful and
invalid as applied to Plaintiffs and the subject property.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief as follows:
A.

That the Court enter its order declaring that the

Owner-Occupant Ordinance and the Family-Only Requirement have
deprived Plaintiffs of their property without due process of law,
are unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, and that such
ordinances or any other ordinance, regulation, or requirement
which would have the same effects are unconstitutional as applied
to the subject properties, and, therefore, are a nullity and of
no legal force or effect;
B.

That the Court enter its order permanently enjoining

Provo City from enforcing its Owner-Occupant Ordinance and
Family-Only Requirement to the subject properties;
C.

For a declaration that Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-408 is

unconstitutional and unlawful as applied to Plaintiffs;
B.

For a judgment of money damages in favor of Plaintiffs

and against Defendant in an amount to be proven at trial;
E.

For pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, and for

reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred herein, to the
maximum extent permitted by law; and
F.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems

just and appropriate.
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JURY DEMAND
Plaintiffs request a trial by jury on all issues so triable,
DATED this

fws

day of November, 2000.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

.dd

By

Reed L. Martineau
Kkith A. Call
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Jerald and Bonnie Anderson, Michael Johnston, Sheila Johnston, Jonathan Myres, Jim Tills, Gigi I
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